https://iild.razavi.ac.ir/ آموزه های اسلام و حقوق بین الملل en daily 1 Sun, 24 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +0430 Sun, 24 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +0430 https://iild.razavi.ac.ir/article_1630.html Although the basic principle is that the law of lex fori governs all claims brought in any government, sometimes in the claims of private international law, according to the rules of resolving the conflict of laws of lex fori, foreign law has jurisdiction and is the basis for consideration and passing a judgment. The implementation of the competent foreign law is conditional on some non-existent conditions, one of which is that the foreign law does not contradict the public order of lex fori, and that is why public order is one of the most important issues of "conflict of laws" which is discussed in private international law. With the assumption that in Islamic jurisprudence and law, based on the rule of obligation and interpretation, sometimes the (non-Islamic) foreign law is the basis for consideration in the Islamic court, the question arises whether in Islamic jurisprudence and law, there is a concept like public order that prevents the implementation of the non-Islamic competent foreign law, based on opposition to public order. Seeking an answer to this question, this article has concluded that the title "Ma la yorza beh al-share" and other similar titles play the role of the concept of public order. https://iild.razavi.ac.ir/article_2309.html Interstate conflicts and political divergence are among the most important challenges facing the Islamic world. The present study, with a descriptive-analytical approach and with the aim of providing an endogenous solution, seeks to design a jurisprudential-legal framework for resolving disputes by reinterpreting the Prophet's life as a "dynamic legislative source." By analyzing the qualitative content of four key case studies (the Treaty of Medina, the Treaty of Hudaybiyah, the Conquest of Mecca, and diplomatic letters), this research shows that prophetic diplomacy is not simply a set of moral recommendations, but a coherent legal doctrine. The findings led to the extraction of twelve fundamental principles in three areas: 1. Legal-structural (based on contractual citizenship and collective security), 2. Diplomatic-behavioral (based on the priority of negotiation and expediency-oriented flexibility), and 3. Legal-restorative (based on general amnesty and restorative justice instead of criminal justice). These principles, which cover the entire cycle of relations, from state formation to crisis management and sustainable post-conflict peace, have the capacity and legitimacy necessary to establish a “Supreme Judicial Council of the Islamic Ummah.” This framework, based on the foundations of jurisprudence and shared values, can serve as an effective complement to contemporary international institutions. https://iild.razavi.ac.ir/article_2341.html Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Rome Statute addresses the concept of the interests of justice, which is one of the concepts that has remained undefined since the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. It serves as an exception allowing the suspension of investigation or prosecution, taking into account such as the interests of victims, the age and infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime. Utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics are among the major philosophical schools through which the practical justificatory–ethical foundation of this concept can be examined. Utilitarians and virtue ethicists consider the suspension of investigation and prosecution acceptable in line with the interests of justice, whereas deontologists regard this as unacceptable. In this article, we aimed to first describe justice based on Islamic and Western schools of thought and then, after a brief explanation of the concept of the “interests of justice” as articulated in the Rome Statute, we placed this notion on the scales of utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics in order to conduct an analytical examination. We aimed to answer the following questions: What is the meaning of justice in Islamic and non-Islamic schools? What is intended by the “interests of justice” within the framework of the Rome Statute? Can a Justificatory–Ethical basis for the interests of justice be obtained in philosophical schools?